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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a fast multi-stage method for on-line detection of RTP streams and codec
identification of transmitted voice or video traffic. The method includes an RTP detector that filters
packets based on specific values from UDP and RTP headers. When an RTP stream is successfully
detected, codec identification is applied using codec feature sets. The paper shows advantages and
limitations of the method and its comparison with other approaches. The method was implemented
as a part of network forensics framework NetFox developed in project SEC6NET. Results show
that the method can be successfully used for Lawful Interception as well as for network monitoring.
Keywords: network forensics, RTP detection, codec identification, VoIP

1.

INTRODUCTION

Network monitoring and traffic analysis either
for the purpose of network management or network forensics faces the challenges of handling
big real-time data streams. Filtering input data
is necessary to obtain only relevant information
for further processing. Many applications for
analysis and monitoring of VoIP (Voice over IP)
and multimedia communication rely on the efficient identification of RTP streams or sessions1
in order to isolate VoIP communication from
the rest of Internet traffic.
Transmission of multimedia streams over
packet networks is very popular today. It includes transmission of voice over IP that almost
replaced traditional telephony, transmission of
video streams like video on demands (VoD), online streaming (radio/TV streams), video conferencing, etc. These services work on the application level of OSI model using signalling protocols
for establishing and maintaining communication,
1

By a RTP stream/session we understand a one-way
sequence of RTP packets transmitting a multimedia content (voice, video) between two communicating parties.

c 2014 ADFSL

e.g., SIP, H.323, or RSTP, and data transmission
protocols for passing voice and video data, e.g.,
RTP/RTCP (Schulzrinne, Casner, Frederick, &
Jacobson, 2003). Since RTP streams are routed
independently over the Internet, it is not always
easy to detect these streams if signalization is
missing at the point of observance.
Detection of RTP streams and classification
of RTP payload is an important task for network administrators in order to find out how
many VoIP/video sessions are established and
what bandwidth is required for these sessions
according to QoS requirements. RTP detection
and classification is also needed in the area of
Network Forensics and Lawful Interception (LI)
where Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) should
detect and analyze a communication that deals
with criminal activities. The task is more complex than eavesdropping in classical telephony,
where communicating parties use a dedicated
line for all communication. In VoIP, each direction of communication is transmitted independently using a sequence of RTP packets that
are routed over the dynamic topology of packetbased network.
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In this work we focus on the detection of
RTP protocols without knowing signalization,
i.e., without knowing L4 identification of RTP
traffic (ports). Our RTP detector identifies and
filters RTP packets on the fly using selected
values from IP and UDP headers. Since RTP
uses dynamic ports on L4, other UDP traffic
can be mistaken for RTP transmission. Our
results prove that with a sufficient number of
RTP packets per stream we are able to detect
an RTP stream with high probability in real
time. If the minimum number of RTP packets
per stream is set to 10, the probability of false
positives comes near to zero depending on the
type of traffic.
Another part of our work deals with the classification of codecs used to encode multimedia contents encapsulated in a RTP stream. Common
audio and video codecs can be identified using a
payload type (PT) value from the RTP header.
This value corresponds to RTP Audio/Video
Profiles as defined in RFC 3551 (Schulzrinne
& Casner, 2003). However, there are two limitations. First, RTP Audio/Video Profiles list
only well-known codecs with a static PT value.
Such codecs are called static codecs. Many RTP
streams transmit audio and video data encoded
using dynamic codecs where a value of the codec
is not standardized and signalling protocols like
SIP/SDP, or H.323 are needed to inform communicating sites about the codec type. The latter limitation reflects the fact that open source
codecs used in VoIP softphones and hard phones
have different PT numbers depending on implementation even for the same codec, see Table
1.
This table shows PT types of common audio
and video codecs in soft phones (Ekiga, X-lite, SJ
Phone), hard phones (Well T20, Linksys WRP
400-G2), and video terminal software Polycom
PVX. You can see that for static codecs like
G.711 PCM A-law, µ-law, GSM, G.722, H.261,
H.263, or H.264 payload type can be determined
using a PT value in RTP header. However, for
dynamic codecs like iLBC, Speex, or G.726 PT
value can differ. Even the same software (Ekiga)
differs in versions under Windows (Ekiga W) or
under Unix (Ekiga U).
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It means that the PT value in the RTP header
cannot be used without validation as a unique
codec identifier. That is the reason why our
codec classifier implements advanced codec classification using a specific feature set. This
method employs specific features of RTP packets related to codecs, e.g., length of the packet,
time delay between two adjacent RTP packets,
and typical patterns of the payload in the codec
classification.

1.1

Contribution

The main contribution of our work is a fast
method for RTP detection and codec classification that combines several approaches in order to detect a RTP stream and its codec with
high probability on the fly. This is especially
valuable for high-speed networks where fast and
less resource-demanding processing is strongly
required. Another contribution related to our
work is a creation of an annotated reference
dataset that contains real RTP streams encapsulating multimedia payload encoded using different codecs. The dataset was generated in
order to test our application for accuracy and
for the comparison with other tools. The dataset
is freely available to researchers who work with
RTP detection and codec classification2 . It contains 60 annotated PCAPs (Packet Capture File
Format) with RTP streams encoded using different codecs and sampling frequencies.

1.2

Structure of the Paper

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of related work in the area of RTP detection and
codecs classification. It discusses advantages
and limitations of current methods and compares
them with our approach. Section 3 describes our
method of RTP detection and codec classification. This section shows how payload type (PT)
in RTP header should be understood in terms
of classification and how PT values of dynamic
codecs depend on the end-point application or
device. Section 4 shows how our tool RTPinfo
2

Codecs Database is available for download at
https://nes.fit.vutbr.cz/ansa/pmwiki.php?n=Main
.Codecs.

c 2014 ADFSL

Fast RTP Detection and Codecs Classification ...

JDFSL V9N2

Table 1 Values of RTP Payload Types (PT) in Different Applications
Codec
G.711 µ-law
G.711 A-law
iLBC
Speex-16
Speex-8
GSM
MS-GSM
G.721
G.722
G.726-16
G.726-24
G.726-32
G.726-40
G.728
G.729
H.261
H.263
H.263-98
H.264

Ekiga (W)
0
8
110
125
124
3
106
9
105
104
103
102
31
34
108
109

Ekiga (U)
0
8
116
113
112
3
123
9
122
121
120
119
31
-

X-lite
0
8
98
100,106
97,105
3
34
115
-

was tested on well-known classified data. The
result is compared with other tools (Wireshark,
PacketScan, Cisco nBAR). The last part of the
paper summarizes our results and discusses directions for the future work.

2.

RELATED WORK

The classification of network applications, including RTP detection, was explored by research
teams (Costeux, Guyard, & Bustos, n.d.) or
(Zhang et al., 2008), as well as by commercial
companies (Cisco Systems, 2002). These approaches mostly use pattern-based methods, i.e.,
packet classification using a check of selected
field in IP, UDP, and RTP headers, or welldefined patterns in RTP payload. Cisco Network Based Application Recognition (nBAR)
(Cisco Systems, 2002) looks deeper into RTP
header and successfully classifies RTP packets based on multiple attributes in the RTP
header rather than UDP port numbers. However, nBAR is not able to identify codecs in
RTP payload, as our tests showed. Costeux
et al. (n.d.) use per-packet checking for RTP
identification. Their algorithm is based on validation check described in (Schulzrinne et al.,
c 2014 ADFSL

SJ Phone
0
8
97,98
110
-

Well T20
0
8
9
18
-

Linksys
0
8
98
99
-

PVX
0
8
101,102,103
9
15
18
31
34
96
109

2003). Unfortunately their paper does not reveal
how their approach is accurate. According to
our tests, per-packet RTP checking can be inaccurate for short RTP streams where possibility
of false positives rises. Thus, in our approach
we implement a two-stage detection combined
with a codec classification. The first stage of
the detection works on per-packet basis using a
similar algorithm as described by Costeux et al.
(n.d.), however we use different filters to check
if a packet is RTP. The second stage of our detection validates previous results using per-flow
checking that minimizes false positives and false
negatives.
Another part of our work is codec identification in detected RTP streams. There are many
algorithms for the audio and video codec identification proposed in research papers. Most
of these algorithms is based on the machine
learning and observation of statistical properties of codecs. These approaches usually require
a set of features of the incoming stream that
is compared with a set of training profiles using neural networks (Yargicocglu & Ilk, 2012),
chaotic sets (Hicsonmez, H.T.Sencar, & Avcibas,
2011), etc. These methods give very precise
Page 103
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results. Their main disadvantages are (i) the
need of well-established training sets of different
codecs, and (ii) complex implementation of a
chosen method. Thus, these methods are not
suitable for the fast on-line processing of a highvolume Internet traffic that is usually required
by monitoring devices and LI probes in network
forensics.
Another approach described by Bestagini, Allam, Milani, Tagliasacchi, and Tubaro (2012)
analyses video codecs using coding-based footprints. The idea of codec footprints was applied
in our approach where we formed a set of specific
features for each codec to be identified. These
features are derived directly from RTP headers
what makes the classification really fast.

3. RTP DETECTION AND
CODEC CLASSIFICATION
RTP sessions use dynamically negotiated ports,
so it is not easy to identify that a given UDP
packet transmits RTP. At the first glance, identification is nontrivial since RTP packets do not
contain an explicit protocol identifier. However,
by observing specific header fields over several
packets, we can identify RTP streams with high
probability. In our approach, we combine two
types of check of RTP traffic (Perkins, 2003):
Per-packet checking is based on fixed known
values of the header field. RTP header
fields recommended for validity checks are
described in (Schulzrinne et al., 2003, Appendix A) and include (i) RTP version
(must be 2), (ii) payload type (must be
known and not equal to SR or RR, i.e., not
reserved values 72--26 (Schulzrinne & Casner, 2003)), (iii) padding bit P (if is set,
then the last octet must contain a valid
octet count), (iv) extension bit X (must be
set to zero if the profile does not specify it),
and (v) the length of the packet (must be
consistent with CC and PT).
Per-flow checking processes a sequence of
possible RTP packets with a unique SSRC3
3

SSRC stands for Synchronization Source. It is a
32-bit integer identifying participants in a RTP session.
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Figure 1 Scheme of RTP Detection and Codec
Identification
identifier and checks (i) if the sequence numbers are properly incremented, and (ii) if
timestamp intervals correspond with the
payload type and sampling frequency.
Our method implements combination of perpacket and per-flow checking. At first, per-packet
checking processes incoming UDP packets and
possible RTP packets are selected. Then, the
selected packets are grouped into RTP streams
by per-flow checking. The per-flow checking process also provides a codec classification using a
specific feature set described later. In the following text we describe the algorithm of detection
and classification. Moreover, the results of classification on a testing dataset are presented.

3.1

Multi-Stage Filtering in RTP
Detector

Here we describe how the packet processing in
our tool RTPinfo works. At first, incoming packets are processed one by one by the RTP detector
that implements enhanced per-packet checking.
If a packet is classified as an RTP packet, it
is grouped with other RTP packets into RTP
streams by a stream collector that performs the
per-flow checking and codec identification, see
Figure 1. If a possible RTCP packet is detected,
is analyzed using RTCP Analyser and then it is
assigned to a corresponding stream.
The first-stage of the per-packet checking in
the RTP detector filters incoming packets by
rules based on RTP validity checks (Schulzrinne
et al., 2003, App. A) and our observations:
c 2014 ADFSL
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1. Only IPv4 or IPv6 datagrams with UDP
payload are permitted.
2. Source and destination ports of UDP must
be higher than 1023.
3. The length of an application header must
be at least minimal RTP header length according to CSRC Count (CC), i.e., higher
than 12 + 4 × CC bytes.
4. RTP version must be 2.
5. RTP payload type must be within the range
defined by RFC 3550. Packets with PT
type containing unassigned or reserved values are filtered out.
6. If padding bit P is set, the last byte of the
padding is checked with the total length
of the packet. However, some devices (like
Tanberg Video Conferencing System) set P
bit but did not properly set the last byte of
the padding. Thus, the padding bit filtering
can be switched off in our tool.
If a packet successfully passes all the above
written filtering rules, it is marked as an RTP
packet. Then, the second stage of detection is
applied: RTP packets with the same source and
destination IP addresses, source and destination
ports and the same SSRC identifier are grouped
together into a possible RTP stream using the
per-flow checking. If the number of packets in an
RTP stream is higher than a required minimum,
the RTP stream is successfully detected. Otherwise, the packets are considered false negatives
and labeled as non-RTP data.
There are also additional possibilities of the
per-flow checking like checking sequence numbers of packets, checking incrementation of
timestamps in adjacent packets, etc. However,
these checks don’t work properly with some
video streams. If an inter-leaved video is transmitted using RTP, RTP packets with the same
timestamp would have different sequence numbers. Also, if two audio or video sources are
mixed together, it can happen that a recently
received packet could have an older timestamp
than a previously received packet. Even though
c 2014 ADFSL
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this behavior violates the basic rules of audio
transmission, it is valid for video traffic. Thus,
we decided to check only the number of packets
in RTP streams without losing the accuracy of
detection.
Table 2 shows, how the correctly chosen minimum number of RTP packets per stream can
decrease number of false positives and false negatives. In the table, you can see four tests with
minimum packets per stream set to 100, 10, or 1.
If minimum is set to 1, only per-packet checking
(i.e., the first stage of detection) is applied. You
can see in Test no. 4, that there is an enormous number of false positives in this case. For
some inputs, per-packet checking can generate
inaccurate results. This is the reason, why the
multi-stage detection was implemented. A naive
approach would expect that the higher value of
minimum number of packets per stream (e.g.,
100) is more efficient since shorter streams cannot transmit any useful video or audio records.
Nevertheless, our results in Table 2 reveal that
there can be real RTP streams with just few
packets and value 100 can be too high for them.
We can see that in Test no. 1 and 2, the considerable number of false negatives was detected
because streams shorter than 100 RTP packets were not labeled as an RTP stream. For
some kind of traffic, even value 10 is too high
to be the minimum of packets per stream. Our
tests showed that the optimal value for the minimum packets per stream varies between 2 to 5
depending on the input traffic.

3.2

Codecs Classification Using a
Specific Feature Set

Similar to the previously mentioned approaches
(Yargicocglu & Ilk, 2012; Hicsonmez et al., 2011;
Jenner & Kwasinski, 2012), we are able to detect a set of known codecs, that are specified in
Codec Mapper Table (CMT). If an RTP stream
contains a payload with a codec whose features
are not specified in CMT, the codec is not recognized and it is classified as unknown. Currently,
we are able to classify about 20 common audio
codecs and their variants. Classification of video
codecs will be added in a new version of the tool.
CMT table uses four distinguished features
Page 105
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Table 2 Impact of Minimal Packets per Stream on False Positives/Negatives
Min Pkts/stream
No. of real RTP streams
Detected RTP streams
No. of real RTP pkts
Detected pkts
Total Pkts in pcap
False Positives
False Negatives
Exec Time (s)
Test pcap size (MB)
Min Pkts/stream
No. of real RTP streams
Detected RTP streams
No. of real RTP Pkts
Detected pkts
Total Pkts in pcap
False Positives
False Negatives
Exec Time (s)
Test pcap Size (MB)

Test no. 1
10
1
7
7
7
7
36 603
36 603
36 603
36 603
38 193
38 193
0
0
0
0
46
46
21
21
Test no. 3
100
10
1
6
6
6
6
6
8
184 107 184 107 184 107
184 107 184 107 184 111
197 163 197 163 197 163
0
0
4
0
0
0
227
227
227
180.8
180.8
180.8
100
7
5
36 603
36 490
38 193
0
113
46
21

(payload type, ∆ time, payload size, and ∆ ratio).
By these features we are able to classify a codec
of the RTP payload using RTP header values
only. The set of specific features for the most
common audio codecs is shown in Table 3. In the
following text we describe how these features are
determined and how the classification proceeds.
3.2.1

Codec Features

The first feature is a payload type. This feature is extracted directly from RTP header field
PT. Our tests proved that static values of the
payload type as defined in standard RFC 3551
(Schulzrinne & Casner, 2003) are constant for
end-point devices and can be used as a unique
feature to identify a corresponding audio or video
codec. For some codecs (e.g, G.723) the value of
PT points only to the codec category and does
not say anything about sub-categories what is often important for the proper decoding. In VoIP,
the missing information (e.g., sampling period)
is included in signalling protocols like SIP/SDP.
For the classification without signalization, we
need to use additional features to classify the
codec sub-category precisely, e.g., to determine
Page 106

Test no. 2
10
1
30
30
26
30
99 646
99 646
99 638
99 646
101 169 101 169
0
0
8
0
121
121
59.9
59.9
Test no. 4
100
10
1
4
4
4
2
2
11 060
19 311
19 311
19 311
19 300
19 300
30 367
126 257 126 257 126 257
0
0
11 056
11
11
0
217
218
218
107.3
107.3
107.3
100
30
20
99 646
99 478
101 169
0
168
121
59.9

if it is G.723.1-5k codec or G.723.1-6k codec. If
a PT value falls into the dynamic codecs range,
this first feature cannot be used as a unique
codec identifier (see Table 1). In this case, the
value is internally set to −1, it means a feature
not used, and other features are tested.
The second feature of the codec classification
is ∆ time. ∆ time is given as the difference
between timestamps of adjacent packets i and
j, i.e., ∆ time = tj − ti , where j = i + 1, tx is a
timestamp of packet x. ∆ time is computed for
each pair of adjacent RTP packets of the stream.
It should be the same for all RTP packet of the
given RTP stream. If the value of ∆ time differs
between any two adjacent packets of the RTP
stream, it means that the packetization time was
changed during RTP transmission. This may
happen for video transmissions when adjacent
samples are very similar (static scenes) and the
sender decides to change the sampling period
in order to safe bandwidth. Looking at audio
codecs, this was also observed for Silk codecs
only. In case of changing ∆ time value, the feature is set to zero and the feature is invalidated
for the further classification.
c 2014 ADFSL

Fast RTP Detection and Codecs Classification ...

JDFSL V9N2

Table 3 Codec Mapper Table (CMT) with Specific Codec Features
Codec
G.711 µ-law
G.711 A-law
Speex8
Speex16
GSM
G.722
G.722.1
G.723.1-5k
G.723.1-6k
G.726-16
G.726-24
G.726-32
G.726-40
G.729
G.729a
G.729b
AMR-WB
AMR-12k
Silk8
Silk16

Payload Type
0
8
dyn
dyn
3
9
dyn
4
4
dyn
dyn
dyn
dyn
18
18
18
dyn
dyn
dyn
dyn

Payload size, or the voice payload size, contains the length of RTP payload. This value
is mostly fixed for many codecs. However, the
payload size can be manually configured at endpoint devices for some codecs. This is typical
for G.726 (all variants) and G.729b (if VAD is
switched on, see * in CMT table). In these cases,
also ∆ time changes but the ratio between ∆
time and the payload size remains unchanged.
Thus, ∆ ratio is further used as the fourth classification feature. Some codecs (for example
Silk8, Silk16) use a variable payload size, so this
feature cannot be applied in their case.
∆ ratio is an important feature especially for
codecs with a variable packetization period (e.g.,
G.726 codecs). ∆ ratio is fixed because timestamp values in RTP packets are related to the
packetization time and the payload size. So,
when the packetization period changes, timestamps are changed too but ∆ ratio remains constant as seen in Table 3 for G.726 codecs. This
ratio is also used to distinguish sub-categories
of G.723 as seen in that table.
Using a specific feature set, we are able to
uniquely detect at least 20 different audio codecs
with high probability. Additional features were
c 2014 ADFSL

∆ time
160
160
160
320
160
160
320
240
240
80/240
80/240
80/240
80/240
160
160
160*
320
160
320
640

Payload Size
160
160
20
52
33
160
60
20
24
20/60
30/90
40/120
50/150
20
20
20*
62
33
var.
var.

∆ ratio
1:1
1:1
8:1
80:13
160:33
1:1
16:3
12:1
10:1
4:1
8:3
2:1
8:5
8:1
8:1
var.
160:31
160:33
var.
var.

also considered, like payload patterns. Payload
patterns can be successfully used for the identification of most video codecs and some audio
codecs like GSM, G.723, or Speex. However, the
current set of four features seems to be sufficient
for the successful identification of most common
audio codecs as our experiences show. The main
advantages of this method are its simplicity,
quality of accuracy, and high performance for
large data volumes.
3.2.2

Codec Classification

The process of classification is implemented in
Stream Collector during per-stream checking.
The classification works as multi-stage filter using the set of codecs from CMT. Input RTP
streams are compared with each CMT entry.
When a match on the specific feature is found,
the next feature is examined. Using four features,
four steps of comparison are provided for each
CMT entry during the processing. Then, the
best codec is selected according to the number
of features matched.
This classification algorithm works with constant time complexity. Its input values are taken
only from RTP headers. The accuracy of the
Page 107
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algorithm depends on the feature set specified in
CMT. Adding a new codec to the CMT table is a
simple operation that includes (i) determination
of a specific feature set of the new codec, and
(ii) insertion of a new entry into CMT.
Currently, our CMT contains 20 entries of
the most common audio codecs. Now, we are
working on adding video codecs to the database.
For some new codecs, it can be useful to add
a new feature into CMT, e.g., payload pattern
and offset of the pattern in the payload. Adding
a new feature is straightforward operation in our
classifier because each filtering stage is independent.

4.

RESULTS

RTP detection and codec classification was
tested on a RTP dataset that was created for the
project. The comparison with three other tools
for RTP detection and codec identification was
done: we used open source packet analyzer Wireshark, professional analyzer PacketScan from GL
Communications, Inc., and Cisco nBAR feature
on Cisco 2911 routers.

4.1

RTP Dataset

For testing purposes, an annotated dataset containing RTP streams with known codecs was
created. To our best knowledge, we are not
aware of any available dataset with real VoIP
communication encoded by different codecs.
The RTP dataset was generated using the following tools: soft phone Ekiga (Ekiga Set), Cisco
ISR router with Call Manager Express (CME
Set), and IXIA XM2 tester (IXIA Set). Each
generated set contains several RTP streams with
signalling protocols (mostly SIP signalization).
For the codec classification, we modified these
RTP datasets so that all signalling packets were
removed from PCAP files. Thus, the classification is based on processing of RTP packets
only.
Our RTP dataset contains several PCAP files
with RTP streams transmitting a voice encoded
by following codecs, see Table 4.
Page 108

4.2

Testing and Results

The testing was performed on all PCAP files
from our RTP Datasets. In Wireshark configuration, decoding of RTP packets outside conversation was allowed in Edit/Preferences/Protocols.
PacketScan had a default configuration without
additional changes. The results of classification
tests are in Tables 5, 6, and 7 for each tested application, i.e., Wireshark (W), PacketScan (P),
and our application RTPinfo (R). For each application, two values are shown: a number of
detected RTP packets (RTP) and a name of the
identified codec (Codec).
In Table 5 we can see, that not all applications were able to detect RTP packets. Wireshark and RTPinfo detected the same number
of RTP packets while PacketScan missed some
RTP packets. The number of false negatives of
PacketScan was 10. Concerning codec identification, our tool RTPinfo (R) was the most accurate. Each tool had problems with identification
of Silk codec that uses a variable packetization
time and payload size, see Table 3. RTP packets with Silk payload generated by Ekiga had
value PT=92. According to standard RFC 3551
(Schulzrinne & Casner, 2003), this value is restricted and should not be used. Wireshark was
able to recognize all static codecs, however it did
not classify dynamic codecs correctly. A similar
result was observed by PacketScan where static
codecs classification was successful but the tool
did not match any dynamic codec properly.
Similar results were detected for CME set, see
Table 6. Wireshark and RTPinfo were able to
detect all RTP packets properly, Packet Scan
missed some packets. All applications were able
to determine all codecs successfully.
The reason is that all codecs of this set are
static with well-defined fixed PT value. We can
see that RTPinfo was able to detect even subcategory of G.729 that is important for proper
decoding.
Last tests were done using IXIA set, see Table
7. Similarly to the previous tests, the number of
detected RTP packets by Wireshark and by RTPinfo is correct. Again, PacketScan missed few
RTP packets. Wireshark was able to classify all
c 2014 ADFSL
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Table 4 Overview of our RTP Datasets
Codec
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
Speex8
Speex16
GSM
G.722
G.722.1
G.723.1 5,3 kbps
G.723.1 6,3 kbps
G.726-16
G.726-24
G.726-32
G.726-40
G.729
G.729a
G.729b
AMR-WB
AMR 12,2 kbps
Silk8
Silk16

Ekiga Set
pcma.pcap
pcmu.pcap
speex8.pcap
speex16.pcap
gsm.pcap
g722.pcap
g722-1.pcap

CME Set
g711alaw.pcap
g711ulaw.pcap

g726-16.pcap
g726-24.pcap
g726-32.pcap
g726-40.pcap
g729r8.pcap
g729br8.pcap

IXIA Set
alaw.pcap
ulaw.pcap

g7231-5k.pcap
g7231-6k.pcap
g726-16-a.pcap
g726-24-a.pcap
g726-32-a.pcap
g726-40-a.pcap
g729.pcap
g729a.pcap
g729b.pcap

amr-wb.pcap
amr-12.pcap
silk8.pcap
silk16.pcap

Table 5 Testing on Ekiga Set (W---Wireshark, P---PacketScan, R---RTPinfo)
File
pcma.pcap
pcmu.pcap
speex8.pcap
speex16.pcap
gsm.pcap
g722.pcap
g7221.pcap
g726-16.pcap
g726-24.pcap
g726-32.pcap
g726-40.pcap
amr-wb.pcap
silk8.pcap
silk16.pcap

RTP (W)
822
791
804
1015
796
736
846
609
583
588
623
717
663
631

Codec (W)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
Unknown
Unknown
GSM 06.10
G.722
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

RTP (P)
812
781
794
1005
786
726
838
599
573
578
615
707
653
621

Codec (P)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
Speex 16kHz
iSAC
GSM 06.10
G.722
AMR-WB
G.726 40kbps
EVRCC
G.711 µ-law
G.711 A-law
G.726 32kbps
Unknown
Unknown

RTP (R)
822
791
804
1015
796
736
846
609
583
588
623
717
663
631

Codec (R)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
Speex 8kHz
Speex 16kHz
GSM 06.10
G.722
G.722.1
G.726 16kbps
G.726 24kbps
G.726 32kbps
G.726 40kbps
AMR-WB
Unknown
Unknown

Table 6 Testing on CME Set (W---Wireshark, P---PacketScan, R---RTPinfo)
File
g711alaw.pcap
g711ulaw.pcap
g729r8.pcap
g729br8.pcap
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RTP (W)
1245
1379
2797
1291

Codec (W)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
G.729
G.729

RTP (P)
1235
1369
2787
1281

Codec (P)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
G.729
G.729

RTP (R)
1245
1379
2797
1291

Codec (R)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
G.729a
G.729b
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Table 7 Testing on IXIA Set (W---Wireshark, P---PacketScan, R---RTPinfo)
File
alaw.pcap
ulaw.pcap
g7231-5k.pcap
g7231-6k.pcap
g726-16.pcap
g726-24.pcap
g726-32.pcap
g726-40.pcap
g729.pcap
g729a.pcap
g729b.pcap
amr-12.pcap

RTP (W)
48016
48016
32012
32012
96032
96032
96032
96032
48016
48016
40882
48016

Codec (W)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
G.723.1
G.723.1
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
G.729
G.729
G.729
Unknown

RTP (P)
48006
48006
32002
32002
96022
96022
96022
96022
48006
48006
40872
48006

Figure 2 nBAR Detection of RTP
static codecs but it was not able to distinguish
sub-categories of G.729 and G.723. As in previous tests, it was not able to identify dynamic
codecs. PacketScan was successful in the static
codec classification but it did not match any
dynamic codec properly.
We also made tests with Cisco nBAR on Cisco
ISR G2 router. Data from our datasets were sent
through a network where ISR router with nBAR
was present. We discovered that nBAR was able
to detect all RTP packets properly, so the result
would be the same as Wireshark or RTPinfo in
tables 5, 6, 7. However, nBAR is not able to
identify RTP payload, so we skipped other tests.
An example of nBAR detection is in Figure 2.
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Codec (P)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
G.723.1
G.723.1
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
GSM-EFR
G.729
G.729
G.729
G.726 24kbps

RTP (R)
48016
48016
32012
32012
96032
96032
96032
96032
48016
48016
40882
48016

Codec (R)
G.711 A-law
G.711 µ-law
G.723.1 5,3kbps
G.723.1 6,3kbps
G.726 16kbps
G.726 24kbps
G.726 32kbps
G.726 40kbps
G.729/G.729a
G.729/G.729a
G.729b
AMR 12,2kbps

This figure shows that 1243 packets were
properly identified as RTP. Since we used
g711alaw.pcap dataset with 1245 RTP packet
and the total number of packets was 1267, some
packets were missing. We can see that nBAR
totally processed only 1254 packets. After repeating the test with lower injection rate we
found out that nBAR identification works properly, however there is higher packet loss related
to higher rate of incoming packets.
Our tests show that the proposed method of
multi-stage detection of RTP packets and codec
classification using the specific feature set is viable and gives very good results in comparison
with Wireshark or PacketScan. Unlike other
approaches, our method is fast and extremely
simple in terms of computation. The tests show
that its accuracy is also high.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we presented a simple but efficient
method for finding RTP streams in network traffic captures and identification of encapsulated
codecs. Finding RTP streams without possessing
additional information from VoIP signalization
is based on integrity checking of RTP packets.
It uses a threshold value to refine the number of
individual packets in a valid RTP stream. Our
experiments show that this simple approach is
sufficient enough to detect the most of RTP
streams. We also presented a method for identification of codecs in successfully detected RTP
streams. The codec classification employs the
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prior identification of the specific feature set
characterizing different RTP codecs properties.
Feature values for different codecs are organized
in the Codec Mapper Table structure, which is
optimized for quick identification of candidate
codecs of an analyzed RTP stream.
The benefit of the method lies in its simplicity
that enables cheap and efficient implementation
suitable for fast on-line traffic monitoring. Our
method results from an observation that RTP
streams have certain characteristics distinguishing RTP traffic from other communication.
The presented method is usable in network
monitoring applications and network forensics.
With the increase of the VoIP communication
a tool that precisely measures characteristics of
VoIP traffic would greatly help administrators
in the network management. The method can
be also useful during network forensic analysis
in situations when VoIP signalization is missing
or corrupted.
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